Manufacturers often face a choice of whether to recover the value in their end-of-life products through remanufacturing. In many cases, firms choose not to remanufacture, as they are (rightly) concerned that the remanufactured product will cannibalize sales of the higher-margin new product. However, such a strategy may backfire for manufacturers operating in industries where their end-of-life products (cell phones, tires, computers, automotive parts, etc) are attractive to third-party remanufacturers, who may seriously cannibalize sales of the original manufacturer. In this paper, we develop models to support a manufacturer's recovery strategy in the face of a competitive threat on the remanufactured product market. We first model the competition between new and remanufactured products produced by the same firm. The average cost to collect/remanufacture is modelled as an increasing function of the quantity collected/remanufactured, thus capturing a unique aspect of the remanufacturing industry that has not been explored in previous market segmentation research. Our findings provide firms with conditions where the revenue increase from remanufacturing exceeds the detrimental effect of cannibalization. We then characterize the potential profit loss due to external remanufacturing competition and analyze two entry-deterrent strategies: remanufacturing and preemptive collection. We find that a firm may choose to remanufacture or preemptively collect its used products to deter entry, even when the firm would not have chosen to do so under a pure monopoly environment. Finally, we characterize conditions under which each strategy is more beneficial.
While recycling is the most prevalent activity in diverting waste from landfills (for example, two thirds of municipal solid waste that is not landfilled is recycled), the EPA advocates "source reduction" as the preferred way of reducing the burden on the environment (U.S. EPA 2003a). Source reduction refers not only to using fewer and less toxic materials in manufacturing a product, but also to encouraging reuse, "removing a product or component from a retired system and installing it in another system," and remanufacturing, "disassembling, inspecting, repairing, replacing, and reassembling the components of a part or product to like-new condition" (Thorn and Rogerson 2002) . Remanufacturing reduces both raw material and energy consumption. On average, for each pound of new material used in remanufacturing, five to nine pounds are conserved (U.S. EPA 1997).
Remanufacturing auto parts, for example, conserves an estimated 60% of the energy used in making the original product (U.S. EPA 1997).
It is encouraging that there is a market for remanufactured products in the US. For example, by 1997, approximately 73,000 U.S. firms had sold an estimated $53 billion worth of remanufactured products (U.S. EPA 1997). Examples of remanufactured products include automotive parts, cranes and forklifts, furniture, medical equipment, pallets, personal computers, photocopiers, telephones, televisions, tires and toner cartridges, among others. These products are put on the market by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and/or independent remanufacturers.
The Xerox Corporation demonstrated early on that remanufacturing can be a very lucrative prospect (Berko-Boateng et al. 1993 ). In 1991, they obtained savings of around $200 million by remanufacturing copiers returned at the expiration of their lease contracts. Kodak is one of the classic examples of an OEM that has created a fully integrated manufacturing-remanufacturing strategy around its reusable Funsaver camera line (Toktay et al. 2000) . Caterpillar is shifting its strategy from solely manufacturing and selling construction equipment to a leasing and remanufacturing strategy (Gutowski et al. 2001 ). This allows Caterpillar to create a new market among contractors who cannot afford to buy a Caterpillar product outright, but instead, lease one when needed.
Unfortunately from an environmental standpoint, the companies mentioned above represent the exception to the rule; most firms do not adopt the remanufacturing option. In many cases, the choice not to remanufacture is driven by two concerns: cost and internal cannibalization. On the cost side, the cost to remanufacture plus the fixed cost needed to establish a remanufacturing operation may be too high to justify remanufacturing. However, even if the remanufactured product is independently profitable, firms may ignore this option due to concerns about cannibalization:
If the remanufactured product is sold in the same market as the new product, it attracts the same customer population. If, in addition, it is priced lower than the new product, customers may choose to buy the remanufactured product instead. Such internal cannibalization is often assumed by firms to be undesirable if the margin on the new product is higher than the margin on the remanufactured product. The degree and effect of demand cannibalization depends on the relative positioning of the new and the remanufactured products, and their relative margins. For this reason, it is important to jointly determine the prices (called "market segmentation") of the new and remanufactured products to optimize profit.
The question of how to position (or even to offer or not) a remanufactured product is not well understood by the majority of firms today. In the absence of analytical tools to help them, firms often develop rules of thumb such as to never price a remanufactured product more than x% of the price of a new product. Bosch Tools division for example, decides what product lines to remanufacture based upon the product's price and market share. If the market share is below a certain threshold and the new product price is above a given threshold, then the product is remanufactured, otherwise it is not (Valenta 2004) .
If the remanufactured product is independently profitable, but the firm chooses not to invest in remanufacturing, independent remanufacturers may enter the market, resulting in external competition rather than internal cannibalization. The threat of external competition through the remanufactured product is a major concern for many firms. To respond to this threat, several strategies are available to the original manufacturer. Two such OEM strategies are (i) entering the remanufacturing market, or (ii) preemptively collecting its used products. For example, independent PC rebuilders abound, taking market share from OEMs, especially on low-budget customers who do not need the latest technology. In response, companies such as Dell and IBM have started taking back used computers for remanufacture and sale through their own distribution channels (Ginsburg 2001) . To limit competition from remanufacturers, Lexmark introduced the Prebate program whereby customers who return an empty printer cartridge obtain a discount on a new cartridge; Lexmark does not remanufacture these cartridges, recycling them instead (www.atlex.com 2003). Bosch collects a broader range of products than those it remanufactures (Valenta 2004 ).
The choice of recovery strategy in the face of competition remains a challenge in practice. In this paper, we develop models to support decision making concerning recovery strategies under external remanufacturing competition. We start by analyzing a monopolist's pricing decisions for both its new and remanufactured products. We model the (internal) competition between a new and remanufactured product explicitly, as a function of prices and the difference in consumer willingness-to-pay between the products. The average cost to collect and remanufacture is modelled as an increasing function of the quantity remanufactured, thus capturing a unique aspect of the remanufacturing industry that has not been explored in previous market segmentation research.
Our findings provide OEMs with conditions where the cost savings from remanufacturing exceed the detrimental effect of cannibalization. We then explore the implications of an OEM choosing not to remanufacture by modelling the impact of external competition on the OEM's profit if a new firm enters the market and remanufactures the OEM's product. We find that an OEM may choose to remanufacture to deter this entry, even when it would not have chosen to do so under a pure monopoly environment. There are also cases where it is more profitable for the firm to collect the used products (cores) but not remanufacture them. In this case, collection is used as a deterrent to avoid competition from external remanufacturers. Finally, we provide conditions where one deterrent strategy is more profitable than the other. In particular, we provide insights to the following questions:
1. To what extent will the remanufactured product cannibalize sales of new products? Should a firm remanufacture its own product? If yes, how should it price each product? The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we position our research in the context of the relevant literature. Our key assumptions and notation are outlined in §3. In §4, we analyze a monopolist manufacturer's decision concerning whether or not to remanufacture its own product. In §5, we analyze the impact of remanufacturing competition and the effectiveness of entry-deterrent recovery strategies. In particular, §5.1 determines the effect on the firm's profit if an external entrant remanufactures the firm's product and sells it in the same market. §5.2 and §5.3 explore remanufacturing and collection as potential entry-deterrent recovery strategies.
We conclude our analysis by comparing these two strategies in §5.4 and determining when each is appropriate. In §6, we summarize our results and conclude with managerial implications. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
Literature Review
Our research draws on two separate streams of literature: market segmentation and remanufacturing. In this section, we provide a review of the prominent research in each stream and position our research at the point of their intersection. We begin with an overview of the relevant market segmentation literature.
The literature on market segmentation by a monopoly (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Moorthy 1984) studies the optimal pricing and placement of independent products that are differentiated by quality in a market of heterogeneous consumers. The monopolist faces an increasing cost of quality.
Consumers prefer a higher quality to a lower quality but differ in how much they are willing to pay for the quality. The monopolist chooses the quality level and price for each product. Katz (1984) , Moorthy (1988) , and Desai (2001) extend this research stream to allow for external competition.
The major differences between the new product market segmentation research and the remanufacturing problem that we address are: (i) the constraint that the number of remanufactured products must be less than or equal to the number of new products previously produced, (ii) an exogenous relative consumer willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured versus a new product, and (iii) an average collection/remanufacturing cost that increases in the quantity of units collected/remanufactured.
The majority of the existing literature on remanufacturing has focused on operational issues that arise as a result of the return flows of used products. These issues include disassembly (Guide and Srivastava 1998), MRP for product recovery (Kokkinaki et al. 2004 (Fleischmann 2000) , and collection and vehicle routing (Beullens et al. 2004) . In this stream of literature, price and demand are assumed to be exogenous, and consumers do not differentiate between new and remanufactured products. The focus is on determining the cost-minimizing operating policy or system design for a given remanufacturable product and price.
Recently, a number of authors have started exploring market-related issues such as market segmentation, competition, and collection incentives. Debo et al. (2004) focus on a monopolist who considers selling both new and remanufactured products to a customer base that has a lower willingness-to-pay for the remanufactured product. They determine the monopolist's optimal market segmentation and remanufacturability level decisions in an infinite-horizon setting. In a related paper, Ferguson and Koenigsberg (2003) analyze the stocking and pricing decisions of a monopolist who sells perishable goods. Unsold product from the first period can be sold in the second period along with fresh product, and is valued less by consumers. Conditions are derived for when the manufacturer should carry over all, some, or none of its leftover product. The market segmentation model used in these papers is the same as ours, and the constraint on sales of remanufactured or old products by past production levels is explicitly modelled. In contrast, our focus is on analyzing and comparing entry-deterrent strategies in the face of potential competition.
Several papers investigate the impact of competition in a remanufacturing setting from various angles. Groenevelt and Majumder (2001a) , and Ferrer and Swaminathan (2002) assume that new and remanufactured products offered by the OEM are indistinguishable, but that the entrant's remanufactured product is valued less by consumers. Thus, the external competition model in these papers is one with essentially two products as in ours (apart from the internal OEM decision of how much of its own demand to satisfy through remanufacturing). In these papers, both firms make pricing decisions subject to the availability of used products in a two-period model; the proportion of used products available to each company is exogenously given. In Ferrer and Swaminathan (2002) , the OEM collects a fraction of used products for free, and the rest are available to the competitor. The main focus of this paper is characterizing the Nash equilibrium and investigating the impact of various parameters. In Groenevelt and Majumder (2001a) , the collection and remanufacturing cost is linear in the total quantity collected and remanufactured. Again, a given fraction of used products is at the disposal of the OEM, and the rest is available to the competitor. The authors consider four different scenarios depending on whether one party has access to the unused allocation of the other party. The focus is characterizing the equilibrium solution and investigating the impact of various parameters on this solution. Debo et al. (2004) , in an extension, assume that a perfectly competitive remanufactured product market exists, and investigate pricing and remanufacturability level implications for an OEM who only produces the new product. They find that the remanufacturability level provided by the OEM decreases relative to the base case where the OEM controls the remanufactured product market.
Several other papers separately address collection issues. Savaşkan et al. (2004) determine the optimal collection channel configuration of a monopolist manufacturer. Groenevelt and Majumder (2001b) consider a manufacturer and an independent remanufacturer who are price takers in the product market (perfect competition), but who compete on procurement of used products. Motivated by an example from the cellular phone industry, Guide et al. (2003) determine the optimal quality-dependent take-back price schedule for a remanufacturer. Finally, Ray et al. (2003) study the use of trade-in rebates to encourage the customer's replacement of a product and to provide the firm with additional revenues through remanufacturing/reuse operations. These papers reinforce the notion that the average cost of collection/remanufacturing increases with the number of units collected/remanufactured. In our analysis, we assume that all product can be collected, but that the average collection (and remanufacturing) cost increases in the volume collected (and remanufactured). We further assume that the original manufacturer has easier access to the used products -its average collection cost is lower than its competitor's.
Our results complement these two streams of literature on competition and collection in a remanufacturing setting by investigating the effectiveness of remanufacturing and collection as entrydeterrent strategies, and characterizing under what conditions each strategy is preferable. From a modelling perspective, a novelty is that we incorporate an average collection/remanufacturing cost that increases in volume, thus linking our competition models with the procurement models of Groenevelt and Majumder (2001b) , Guide et al. (2003) , and Ray et al. (2003) . We also incorporate fixed costs for collection and remanufacturing, which play an important role in the analysis of entry deterrence.
Key Assumptions and Notation
Before presenting our model, we state and discuss key assumptions specific to our remanufacturing environment. We refer to the firm that originally manufactures the product as the OEM and the firm that remanufactures a product that was originally produced by the OEM as the entrant. Assumption 1. Key problem dynamics are captured in a two-period model.
We develop a two-period model with a single-firm, single-product setting in the first period and potential competition in the second period. The competition in the second period (internal or external) is due to product that was sold new in the first period, and is now sold as a remanufactured product. Our objective is two-fold. First, we study how the presence of competition from remanufactured units affects the OEM's new product pricing decisions and its recovery strategy, captured through our second-period analysis. Second, we study how the possibility of remanufacturing in the future affects the OEM's pricing decisions in the present, captured in our first-period analysis. Assumption 2. The product has a useful lifetime of only one period.
We assume that the product has a useful lifetime of only one period although it may be remanufactured after the first period and provide positive utility for some customers in the second period. This assumption is appropriate as long as periods are chosen of sufficient length for the product being analyzed. Because without remanufacturing it, a product bought in the first period cannot be used in the second period, used products are returned at the end of the first period.
Thus, customer purchase decisions are independent across periods. Assumption 3. Each consumer's willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured product is a fraction δ of their willingness-to pay for the new product.
This assumption gives rise to a vertical differentiation model where consumers' valuation for a product characteristic (typically referred to as 'product quality') has an agreed order, i.e. all consumers prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product (Tirole 1988) . Note that if δ = 0, consumers are not willing to pay anything for the remanufactured product; this eliminates the option of remanufacturing and selling used products. If δ = 1, consumers view the new and remanufactured units as being identical and are willing to pay the same amount for either product.
Most products fall between the two extremes; we assume 0 < δ < 1.
The reason for the lower relative willingness-to-pay is either due to customer concerns about quality or because of a 'fair price' perspective -if it costs less for the manufacturer to remanufacture the product than to make it, the customer wants that reflected in the price. (Préjean 1989 ). These types of fears are typically unfounded; most remanufactured products perform on par with new products. In fact, some products sold as 'remanufactured' or 'refurbished' are just commercial returns without any performance problems that are put on the market again after some testing (Guide and Van Wassenhove 2002) . However, there are also cases where there may be quality problems, especially when independent remanufacturers are in question (Johnson 2001 ). In our model, we assume the products to be of equal quality; the lower willingness-to-pay is due only to consumer perception.
The implication of the customer's lower willingness-to-pay is that even a product of the same specification and warranty as the new product may need to be priced lower to attract customers.
Indeed, refurbished PCs are typically priced at 10-30% below the price of a comparable new system (Kandra 2002 ). Lund and Skeels (1983) also note that the price at which remanufactured automotive components can competitively sell for is 57% of the new item price. We assume that the relative willingness-to-pay is given. There may be cases where the OEM can influence the 'perceived' quality of the remanufactured product through a judicious choice of packaging, warranties, marketing, etc. Our assumption can be interpreted as the firm having chosen to operate under an existing bias, possibly achieved as a result of prior advertising. We assume that consumers' willingness-to-pay (valuations) are distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 1] and that in any period, each consumer uses at most one unit. The market size is normalized to 1. In this vertical differentiation model, a consumer of type φ ∈ [0, 1] has a valuation of φ for a new product and δφ for a remanufactured product. The utility that each consumer derives from purchasing a product is given by the difference of their valuation and the price.
Let q 1 denote the first-period demand for new products, and q 2n and q 2r denote the secondperiod demand for new and remanufactured products, respectively. We derive the demand functions from consumers' utility functions. This construction leads to the following linear inverse demand functions:
for the first period (since there are no remanufactured units available to sell in the first period, there is only one inverse demand function) and
for the second period. The latter functions capture the competition between the remanufactured product and the new product. Note that the relative willingness-to-pay has a different effect on the prices of the new and the remanufactured units (for a given quantity level). As this parameter increases, the price of the remanufactured product increases to take advantage of the increased willingness-to-pay. However, as this parameter increases, the price of the new product decreases as the two products become closer substitutes and there is more competition.
Assumption 5. The average cost of collection/remanufacturing increases in the quantity of the products collected/remanufactured.
As the firm increases the quantity of used products collected, the average cost of acquiring these cores increases, and so does the average cost of remanufacturing them. The concept of collection or remanufacturing cost being convex increasing in the quantity has been identified in several We assume that all firms are profit seeking so a firm will not remanufacture if its incremental profit from doing so is below the total fixed cost F = F c + F r .
Based on the assumptions described above, we introduce the remainder of our notation and describe the model. The OEM can produce new units at a price of c each. The unit cost c must satisfy c < 1, since 1 is the maximum willingness-to-pay of consumers for a new product. If this condition were not satisfied, the firm could not profitably manufacture the new product in the first place. At the beginning of the second period, q 1 cores are available to purchase. The quantity of new product the OEM can produce is not capacity constrained, no more than the q 1 cores available can be remanufactured, i.e., q 2r ≤ q 1 . We summarize the model's parameters and decision variables in Table 1 . Price of new products
New products produced q 2n
New products produced p 2r
Price of remanufactured products q 2r
Number of products remanufactured
Fixed cost of collection
Fixed cost of remanufacturing In this section, we answer the question: "Should a monopolist remanufacture its own product and, if so, how should the remanufactured product be priced in relation to the firm's existing product?"
In our setting, a monopolist refers to an OEM that is not under an immediate threat of an entrant offering a remanufactured version of its product. Devoid of this external competition, a monopolist OEM may still decide to recover and remanufacture its product. In doing so however, the remanufactured offering will cannibalize sales of the OEM's new product. Thus, we model this internal competition to obtain conditions where it is profitable for an OEM to offer both its new product and its remanufactured product in the same market. This is similar to the internal competition models of Debo et al. (2004) and Ferguson and Koenigsberg (2003) with one important difference:
In this model, the average cost to remanufacture is a function of the volume remanufactured. The results of this section will form the basis for the analysis in later sections concerning OEM strategies under the threat of competitive entry. In §4.1 and §4.2, we calculate optimal OEM profits without and with remanufacturing, respectively. These profits are compared in §4.3 to determine the monopolist OEM's optimal strategy.
OEM Profits without Remanufacturing
With no remanufacturing, the two periods are independent and identical. The OEM's objective in the first period is
which is concave inq 1 (tilde denotes the "no remanufacturing" case). Checking first-order conditions yields the familiar monopoly results of
The total optimal two-period profit isΠ * = (1 − c) 2 2 .
OEM Profits with Remanufacturing
We now model the scenario where the OEM remanufactures and sells the remanufactured units in the same market as its new units in the second period. We remove the tilde from our notation to distinguish this case from the "no remanufacturing" case. Since the OEM's second-period decisions are dependent upon the amount sold in the first period, we solve the problem in two stages, starting with the second period.
Second-Period Analysis. In this case, the OEM starts the second period with the opportunity to recover q 1 cores from product that was sold in the first period. In addition to the new product quantity q 2n , the OEM also chooses the number of units to remanufacture, q 2r . With two products on the market, the inverse demand functions are given by (2) and (3). The OEM's second period objective is
First, let us assume that F = 0 and find the optimal solution. A positive fixed cost will be added back at the end of the analysis. Letq . = δc 2(h+δ−δ 2 ) . Since 0 < δ < 1,q > 0.
1−c . The optimal solution is summarized in the table below.
Under Condition 1, where the OEM prefers to sell both products, as q 1 increases, q * 2r is first constrained by q 1 and then unconstrained. Under Condition 2, as q 1 increases, first the maximum possible amount of remanufacturing takes place, but new products are still manufactured, then the maximum possible amount of remanufacturing takes place, and new products are not manufactured, and finally, only remanufactured products are put on the market, but not all the cores are used.
Thus, we infer that the latter case is where the remanufactured product is so profitable that the OEM prefers to put only this product on the market. Since in practice, this case is not prevalent, we focus on Condition 1 for the remainder of our analysis: We assume that h > The profit term cδq 1 −(h+δ−δ 2 )q 2 1 increases from 0 to cδq 2 in the interval q 1 ∈ [0,q], and the profit without remanufacturing is (1−c) 2 4 , thus, if there were no fixed cost associated with remanufacturing used products, then remanufacturing would be undertaken by the manufacturer for any level of q 1 .
On the other hand, with a fixed cost F , the profit differential needs to exceed F for the firm to consider remanufacturing, i.e. Π * 2 (q 1 ) −
> F must hold.
First Period Analysis. After characterizing the OEM's optimal second-period decisions given q 1 , we now solve for the optimal first-period quantity decision. We maximize the total two-period profit Π(q 1 ) = (p 1 − c)q 1 + Π * 2 (q 1 ) with respect to q 1 to determine q * 1 and Π * . = Π(q * 1 ).
, the remanufacturing quantity in period 2 is constrained by q * 1 , and
. If h ≥h, then
2 , the remanufacturing quantity in period 2 is unconstrained by q * 1 , and
Monopolist's Optimal Strategy
The analysis so far assumed F = 0. We now introduce a fixed cost F and determine the optimal strategy for the OEM. Note that the expression
strictly decreases in h, and so doesq.
Therefore, Π * strictly decreases in h. This observation leads to the following result.
Proposition 4 There exists a threshold levelh for the cost of the remanufactured product above which the OEM only sells the new product. When the threshold is reached in the region where h <h, it has the formh =
; when it is reached in the region h ≥h, it has the formh = In this section, we focus on situations where the average cost to remanufacture exceeds the threshold given by Proposition 4 such that a monopolist OEM would choose not to remanufacture, thus opening itself to the threat of competition by a third-party remanufacturer (the 'entrant'). In this context, we answer the question: "How does the potential entrance of a third-party remanufacturer in the second period affect the OEM's recovery strategy?" In particular, we consider two strategies: The OEM remanufactures to deter entry and the OEM collects cores to preempt entry. While there may be other strategies available to the OEM, these two are prevalent strategies, and demonstrate the usefulness of our models. We start by characterizing the second-period Nash equilibrium and calculating OEM profits when an entrant decides to remanufacture the OEM's product ( §5.1) and demonstrate the potential profit loss incurred by the OEM as a result of not having invested in recovery. In §5.2 and §5.3, we analyze the two recovery strategies mentioned. §5.4 compares the two strategies and determines conditions under which each strategy is more profitable.
OEM Profit when the Entrant Remanufactures
Letp 2r ,q 2r andΠ 2 represent the entrant's second-period remanufactured product price, quantity and profit, respectively. The OEM only makes decisions concerning the new product. The OEM's second-period objective given the entrant's choice ofq 2r is
The entrant enters the second period with the opportunity to recover q 1 cores from product that was sold in the first period and faces competition from the OEM's new product. The entrant's objective given the OEM's choice of q 2n is
We assume that the threat of an entrant in the second period does not change the OEM's first period behavior. The OEM's only logical first-period response to potential competition in the second period would be to reduce its first-period production quantity so the entrant has less cores to remanufacture in the second period. It is very unlikely that such an action would ever take place in practice. (For completeness, we can characterize conditions under which such a reduction would not take place, and restrict our subsequent analysis to these conditions, but this is omitted for brevity.) With this restriction, we have that the OEM's optimal first-period solution is simply its monopoly quantity q * 1 = 1−c 2 since this section focuses on cases where the monopolist OEM would not remanufacture. Let the superscript n represent the Nash equilibrium.
As proven in Proposition 4, there is a threshold value of h above which the monopolist OEM would prefer to not remanufacture. The solid lines in Figure 1 plot this threshold as a function of F for different values of c and δ; above the solid line, the monopolist OEM would not remanufacture.
However, this leaves the door open to a potential entrant to remanufacture cores and compete with the OEM. Using the equilibrium profit expression for the entrant from Proposition 5, we can find a similar remanufacturing cost threshold at which the entrant is indifferent between entering the remanufactured product market or not. These thresholds, as functions of F , are represented by dashed lines in Figure 1 for different values of c and δ; below the dashed line, the entrant profitably remanufactures the OEM's cores. As either the manufacturing cost or the relative willingness-to-pay increases, remanufacturing becomes a more attractive option for both parties, and the indifference curves shift accordingly. The area between each pair of OEM and entrant indifference curves is where the monopolist OEM would choose not to remanufacture, but an entrant would find it profitable to do so, detracting from OEM profits. The following example illustrates such a case, using the same parameter values as Example 1.
Example 2. The OEM's first-period production quantity is q * 1 = 0.45. We check whether the entrant is constrained by q * 1 by checking the conditions outlined in Proposition 5. In this caseq = 0.34, so q * 1 ≥q and the entrant is not constrained. Since the entrant only sells in the second period, Since competitor entry is detrimental to OEM profits, we next focus on two recovery strategies designed to discourage an external firm from remanufacturing the OEM's product: remanufacturing and collection.
Strategies to Discourage Competition: OEM Remanufactures to Preempt Entry
In our analysis, we assume that a third-party remanufacturer will only consider entering the market if the OEM decides not to remanufacture itself. Thus, we allow at most one firm to remanufacture in the second period; the OEM always sells the new product. In addition to keeping the analysis tractable by limiting it to two competing products, this assumption is suitable in many settings: Under our assumption that the entrant will not find it profitable to offer the same remanufactured product as the OEM, the OEM may choose to remanufacture its product for the sole purpose of discouraging an external firm from doing so. Obviously, the timing of entry is important, but it is reasonable to assume that the OEM has the advantage in terms of entering the market with a remanufactured product. Thus, a strong signal by the OEM that it intends to remanufacture in the second period should be enough to ward off an outside firm from entering the remanufactured product market. The following example (using the same parameter values as Examples 1 and 2) shows that the OEM may indeed choose to remanufacture its product under the threat of competitor entry.
Example 3. From Example 2, the OEM's total profit under external competition is Π * ,n = 0.301. From Example 1, if the OEM remanufactures, it makes Π * = 0.395, if it doesn't, it makes Π * = 0.405. Thus, even though it is not profit maximizing in this case for the OEM to choose to remanufacture in the absence of external competition sinceΠ * > Π * , it is rational for it to do so to preempt entry by a competitor since Π * > Π * ,n .
Strategies to Discourage Competition: OEM Collects Cores but Does Not Remanufacture
The OEM may try to collect a portion, or all, of the used products and dispose or recycle them To recover the cores, the OEM only incurs the fixed collection cost F c , F c ≤ F and collection cost h c , h c ≤ h since it does not use the cores for remanufacturing. The purpose of collection under this scenario is purely strategic; it limits or completely eliminates competition from the entrant. We assume that the OEM has better access to the owners of the cores (e.g. through trade-in rebates)
and thus can obtain the cores at the lower end of the quadratic cost curve. Another way of saying this is that the OEM has the first choice on what cores to collect and chooses the cores with the lowest collection cost. Thus, if the OEM collects the first y cores, the entrant's remanufacturing cost does not start at zero as in the original case but rather at hy. Therefore, by collecting cores, the OEM not only reduces the supply available to the entrant, but also makes the operation more expensive.
We introduce a new decision variable, q c , the number of cores that the OEM decides to collect. If enough cores are left that the operation is profitable for the entrant, the entrant will remanufacture; collection does not preclude entry since the OEM does not remanufacture. To understand the OEM's decision, consider a scenario with no fixed cost. Then, the OEM's optimal collection strategy can be to collect part or all of the existing supply. The former decision will be taken when the cost of collecting more cores exceeds the savings obtained by avoiding the cannibalization of the new product; the latter decision will be taken when complete collection is more cost effective than incurring revenue loss due to cannibalization. With a fixed cost for the entrant, the OEM never collects all the cores, at most, the OEM collects up to the point where the profit from remanufacturing the remaining cores does not cover the fixed cost of the entrant's operation.
The optimal collection volume of the OEM in the absence of fixed cost on the entrant's part is presented in Proposition 6; call this volumeq c . The optimal collection volume q * c under a fixed cost for the entrant is then found as follows: Calculate the levelq c that would leave the entrant indifferent between entering the market or not (Algorithm 1 in Appendix A). Ifq c ≤q c , then q * c =q c and the entrant is deterred; otherwise, q * c =q c and the entrant collects and remanufactures used cores, creating competition for the OEM. (ii) The following example (using the same parameter values as in the previous three examples)
shows that the OEM may deter entry by recovering some of the cores sold in the first period. Comparing this with a total profit of 0.395 when using remanufacturing as a deterrent, we see that the OEM is better off using a collection strategy. If the fixed cost of collection were the dominant factor, the result would be reversed. For example, if F c = 0.015, then the OEM's two-period profit is 0.390 in the collection strategy, but the profit under the remanufacturing strategy is unchanged since F = 0.02 still holds, so remanufacturing is preferable as an entry-deterrent strategy.
The collection strategy demonstrates the importance of modelling the collection and remanufacturing costs as convex increasing functions of the quantity. If these costs increase linearly in the quantity, the collection strategy becomes less attractive. In particular, when the cost is convex, even in the absence of a fixed cost for the entrant, it is possible for the OEM to deter entry without collecting all the cores. With a linear cost structure, this is not possible since the cost of collecting and remanufacturing each unit is equal, and the OEM is unable to impact the economic viability of the cores available to the entrant; its only lever is to limit the available quantity. For a comparison of our results with those under a linear collection/remanufacturing cost, please refer to Appendix B.
Which Entry-Deterring Strategy should the OEM Adopt?
Example 4 demonstrates that there are conditions under which the remanufacturing strategy dominates the collection strategy and vice versa. In this section, we explore these conditions more fully. In particular, we ask the following questions: "What is the impact of collection costs on the preferred strategy? How do consumer willingness-to-pay and unit manufacturing cost impact the preferred strategy?" We make three observations, which are demonstrated in Figure 2 .
Observation 1. For a given level of h and F, a lower collection cost, either due to the variable component h c or the fixed component F c , increases the relative profitability of the collection strategy.
The reason for this result can be explained as follows: First, with F fixed, it is obvious that a reduction in F c would increase OEM profit in the collection strategy but not change it in the remanufacturing strategy since F is the relevant cost in the latter strategy. Now consider a reduction in h c , keeping everything else constant. Again, OEM profit in the remanufacturing strategy would not change. First, suppose that the optimal solution is to collect enough to completely exclude the entrant from the market. As h c decreases, this is still optimal and the amount that the OEM needs to collect to deter entry is independent of h c and F c since entrant profits are a function of h and F . The OEM profit before collection cost is also independent of these values. Thus, the total OEM profit in the collection strategy monotonically increases as h c decreases. Now, suppose that the optimal solution leaves enough cores for the entrant to enter the remanufactured product market. As h c decreases, the amount collected increases, the amount remanufactured by the entrant decreases, and that manufactured by the OEM increases, leading to a net increase in OEM profit. This observation provides a basis for categorizing products with respect to whether remanufacturing or collection is the better strategy by looking at the relative cost of collection versus remanufacturing.
Observation 2. As the unit manufacturing cost increases, the relative profitability of the remanufacturing strategy increases.
The intuition is the following: The unit manufacturing cost influences only the OEM directly.
As the unit manufacturing cost increases, making profits from the remanufactured product rather than the new product (as the OEM would under a collection strategy) becomes more attractive since the margin on the new product erodes. In other words, for a low-margin product that is relatively cheap to remanufacture, it may be desirable for the OEM to set up a remanufacturing operation not only to benefit from the residual value in the product but also to preempt entry by third parties into the lucrative remanufacturing market.
Observation 3.
As relative willingness-to-pay δ increases, the relative profitability of the remanufacturing strategy increases.
The reason for this result is the following: An increase in the relative willingness-to-pay advantages any party that undertakes remanufacturing. Thus, the collection effort that the OEM must expend to limit or completely deter the entrant increases in δ since the entrant's profitability increases. This decreases the profitability of the collection strategy. At the same time, the profit that the OEM can make from remanufacturing increases, enhancing the profitability of the remanufacturing strategy. Combining the two effects, we conclude that an increased willingness-to-pay for the remanufactured product favors remanufacturing as an entry-deterrent strategy. Thus, market acceptance of the remanufactured product increases the legitimacy of a remanufacturing strategy:
Remanufacturing becomes more profitable both in its own right and as an entry-deterrent strategy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop insights for managers who face potential competition from firms remanufacturing their used products, and who wish to deter entry using a cost-effective recovery strategy.
Motivated by examples from industry, we focus on remanufacturing and collection as two potential entry-deterrent recovery strategies. Our model captures some of the key elements driving the choice of recovery strategy; in particular, we focus on market characteristics and cost drivers. We consider a market where a remanufactured product is valued less than a new product and is targeted to the lower end of the market. Remanufactured product volume is constrained by past sales of the new product. Fixed costs are incurred to set up the collection and remanufacturing operations. The average cost of collection and remanufacturing increases in the quantity collected and remanufactured; this assumption captures a unique aspect of remanufacturing that has not been explored in previous research. Motivated by practice, we also assume that the OEM has easier access to used products and can drive up the effective cost of collection and remanufacturing for the entrant through collection.
Two concerns typically drive the OEM's choice of whether to remanufacture its product: cost and cannibalization. Even if the remanufactured product is independently profitable, firms may ignore this option due to concerns about cannibalization. The decision not to remanufacture in this situation is often made in ignorance, as OEMs lack models to guide them on the financial impact and strategic implications of their decision. Our findings provide OEMs with conditions where the benefits of remanufacturing exceed the detrimental effect of cannibalization.
We also explore the implications of an OEM's decision not to remanufacture. A common misconception of many managers is that if remanufacturing is not profitable for the OEM, it is also not profitable for an external firm. We demonstrate the fallacy in this perception by showing that there is a significant range of fixed and variable remanufacturing costs where although a monopolist OEM would find it more profitable to not remanufacture, an independent entrant would make profits doing so. In other words, the entrant can profitably remanufacture under conditions where the OEM would prefer not to, despite the fact that the two share the same cost structure. For example, for a given variable cost of remanufacturing, the entrant will find it profitable to remanufacture for a much larger range of fixed costs. This result is driven by the cannibalization of the OEM's new product by its remanufactured product. Because of this cannibalization effect, the OEM incurs an opportunity cost when selling remanufactured products that the entrant does not, since the entrant has no other competing product. When this opportunity cost is factored in, the profitability hurdle for the remanufactured product is much higher from the OEM's perspective. If guided only by profits, ignoring the threat of competition, the OEM may choose not to remanufacture, but the consequence may be a significant profit drop if an entrant decides to remanufacture its product. We conclude that the choice to remanufacture should be considered as part of an OEM's competitive strategy.
There are other strategies available to OEMs who wish to deter the entry of a third-party remanufacturer. Total remanufacturing cost is a combination of the cost for collecting the used product and the cost to bring the product back up to its original quality level. Some OEMs deter entry by only incurring the cost of collecting their used product, with no intention of remanufacturing it, simply to increase the cost of a potential remanufacturing competitor. The choice of which strategy to choose to deter competition depends on many interrelated factors. The literature to date has analyzed competition and collection in a remanufacturing setting from different angles, but has not evaluated remanufacturing and collection as potential entry-deterrent mechanisms. Our research provides guidance for when an OEM should choose a remanufacturing strategy over a collection strategy. Our key results are summarized below.
First, we find that when collection is the major portion of the total remanufacturing fixed and/or variable cost, the OEM is better off remanufacturing. This observation provides a basis for categorizing products with respect to whether remanufacturing or collection is the better strategy by looking at the relative cost of collection versus remanufacturing. Second, we find that as the unit manufacturing cost increases, the relative advantage of the remanufacturing strategy increases.
Therefore, for a low-margin product, especially if remanufacturing is cheap, it may be desirable for the OEM to set up a remanufacturing operation. This will allow the OEM not only to benefit from the residual value in the product, but also to preempt entry by third parties into the lucrative remanufacturing market. Finally, we focus on a market characteristic, consumer acceptance of the remanufactured product, as measured by consumers' relative willingness-to-pay for this product.
We find that as market acceptance increases, the relative advantage of the remanufacturing strategy increases. Thus, market acceptance of the remanufactured product increases the legitimacy of a remanufacturing strategy: Remanufacturing becomes more valuable both in its own right and as an entry-deterrent strategy. .
. We need the conditions 0 < − With c < 1, these last two cases show that q 2r = 0 is ruled out. So there are a total of four possible cases, summarized in Tables 2a and 2b below.
2) Table 2a Case Conditions 1) Table 2b For Case 2 to exist, we need δ 2 − δ − h < 0, which is always true since δ < 1. With this observation, we can rewrite Table 2b as follows:
Case Conditions 1) Table 2c The expressions in this table can be simplified:
Case Conditions 1) Table 2d The second condition in Cases 2 and 3 have only to do with the parameters of the problem. So these cases cannot simultaneously hold. Also, if we compare the two limits in Case 1, we find that the resulting inequality is the same as the second condition in Cases 2 and 3: 1−c . First, we need to check that Π * 2 (q 1 ) is continuous at the boundary q 1 =q of the two regions. Since
, this is true. The derivative of Π * 2 (q 1 ) with respect to q 1 for the region q 1 <q is 2q 1 (δ 2 − δ − h) + cδ. It should be positive since increasing q 1 relaxes the constraint. Indeed, 2q 1 (δ 2 − δ − h) + cδ > 0 for q 1 <q, which is exactly what defines Region 1.
At the boundary, the derivative is 0, so not only is Π * 2 (q 1 ) continuous, but it is also continuously differentiable since Π * 2 (q 1 ) is constant for q 1 >q. Therefore, Π(q 1 ) = (1 − q 1 − c)q 1 + Π * 2 (q 1 ) is also continuously differentiable. In addition, it is strictly concave in q 1 .
Taking the derivative of Π(q 1 ) with respect to q 1 , we find
At the boundary q 1 =q, the derivative is 1 − c +
2 ), it means that the optimum is reached at q * 1 <q; if it is positive, the optimum is reached at q * 1 >q. In the former case, q * 1 = 1−c(1−δ) 2(1+h+δ(1−δ)) and the remanufacturing quantity in period 2 is constrained by q 1 ; which gives Π * = (1−c) 2 4
. In the latter case, the optimal solution is q * 1 =
1−c 2
and the remanufacturing quantity in period 2 is unconstrained by q 1 ; which gives Π * = . For h <h, ∆ 1 .
Thus, the incremental profit as a function of h (not taking into account fixed costs) is ∆(h) . = ∆ 1 I {h<h} + ∆ 2 I {h≥h} . Since Π * strictly decreases in h, we can find a thresholdh satisfying ∆(h) = F . When the threshold is reached in the region where h <h, it has the formh =
when it is reached in the region h ≥h, it has the formh = (obtained by solving for h in ∆ 2 (h) = F ). For h <h, it is optimal for the manufacturer to remanufacture its products in period 2; otherwise it is more profitable to only offer new products in period 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Maximizing (5) with respect to q 2n yields the unique solution q * 2n (q 2r ) = 1−c−δq 2r 2
. Maximizing (6) with respect toq 2r yields the unique solutionq * 2r (q 2n ) = min(q * 1 , . In the former case, the equilibrium profit is (2δ+2h−δ
for the OEM and
2 for the entrant. In the latter case, the equilibrium profit is
for the entrant.
Proof of Proposition 6. The second-period profits of the OEM and the entrant including the variable cost of collection (but assuming no fixed cost) are the following:
Their best responses given q c ≤ q 1 are:
Solving these two equations simultaneously assuming that
is positive, we find that the Nash equilibrium can take one of two forms:
In the first case, the entrant uses all available cores, in the second, not. The optimal solution for the OEM is to collect all cores and drive out the entrant entirely, or collect only a portion of the cores, and let the entrant compete on the same market. The choice will depend on the cost of collection versus loss of profit due to competition.
The first case applies for a given q c if q 1 − q c < δ(1+c)−4hqc 4δ+4h−δ 2 , otherwise, the second case applies. The proof proceeds by checking which of the two cases applies for different parameter values.
As before, we assume that the threat of an entrant in the second period does not change the OEM's first period behavior. Thus, the OEM's optimal first period solution is simply its monopoly
2 . Therefore, we will take q 1 = Combining these results with the cases described at the end of the previous paragraph yields cases (i), (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 6. Algorithm 1. We wish to findq c that leaves the entrant indifferent between entering the market or not. In the proof of Proposition 6, we characterized the Nash equilibrium in two cases. We can numerically findq c as follows:
1. Find q c such thatΠ c 2 = F under case (i); call it q 1 c . 
Find

Appendix B: Impact of Remanufacturing Cost Structure
In our analysis, we assumed the collection/remanufacturing cost to be a convex increasing function of volume (Assumption 5). While we believe that this assumption fits the majority of industrial applications, most previous literature assumes collection and remanufacturing costs that increase linearly in volume, and there may exist applications in practice where this is true. Therefore, we compare our earlier results to this case to see how a firm's optimal decisions may differ when its collection and remanufacturing costs are linear. For brevity, results are stated without proof since the proofs are similar to the ones for the quadratic case.
Monopoly Profits. Under Condition 1, the OEM does not remanufacture. Under Condition 2, the OEM prefers to produce both new and remanufactured units. Under Condition 3, the per-unit remanufacturing cost is so low that the OEM desires to sell only remanufactured product up to the monopoly quantity.
Comparing Proposition 7 to the results in Proposition 1, we observe the following.
Remark 8 If F = 0, then the OEM always remanufactures for the convex increasing case but does not remanufacture in the linearly increasing case when h > δc.
To understand the condition for not remanufacturing, h > δc, assume that the OEM chooses its new product price to equal its production cost p 2n = c. This price represents the lower bound of what it can sell its new product for without losing money on the sale. Given this price for the new product, the maximum a customer is willing to pay for a remanufactured product is p 2r = δc based on Assumption 4. If the OEM incurs a per-unit remanufacturing cost greater than this price, then each sale results in a negative profit contribution. Thus, h < δc is a necessary condition for the OEM to consider remanufacturing, corresponding to Condition 1 above.
In the remainder of this section, as with Proposition 1, we focus on the second condition (δc > h > c − 1 + δ). As before, the last condition holds trivially if δ < 1 − c. Comparing with Proposition 3, we see that the structure of the solution is the same, but that the threshold is lower in the linear case. In other words, for the same parameter h, the secondperiod is unconstrained for a larger range of remanufacturing costs. This is because for the same value of h, remanufacturing in the linear case is more expensive for all feasible values of q 2r (since we normalized the maximum volume to 1). When h is different in the two cases such that the nonlinear case is more expensive for high values of q 2r , the opposite effect would be seen for some parameter values.
Profits under Remanufacturing Competition. Again, the structure of the policy is the same as in Proposition 5. Comparing with the quadratic case for the same value of h, the remanufactured product volume is lower and the new product volume is higher in equilibrium under the linear cost case unlessq n 2r = q * 1 in both cases, in which case the Nash equilibrium is the same. This is again because for h the same, the linear structure is more expensive for all values of q 2r . For h large enough in the quadratic case relative to the linear case, the opposite result would hold.
Proposition 10
Collection as an Entry-Deterrent Strategy. A significant qualitative difference between the linear and the quadratic cases is observed if collection is used as an entry-deterrent strategy.
Proposition 11
With linear collection cost h < δc, and F = 0,q n 2r = 0 if and only if q c = q 1 .
This proposition focuses on cases where remanufacturing is independently profitable, and says that when the entrant does not have a fixed cost, the only way the OEM can drive out the entrant is to collect all the cores. In contrast, by inspecting Proposition 6, we see that it is possible for the OEM to drive out the entrant via partial collection even if F = 0 when the collection cost is nonlinear: In cases (ii) and (iii), ifq c = b < 1−c 2 , thenq n 2r = 0. This is because the marginal cost of the first unit it can collect becomes too high for the entrant to consider competing with the OEM by introducing a remanufactured product. Thus, assuming a linear collection cost would result in collection being deemed to be a less effective entry-deterrent strategy than it may truly be.
